Abstract. Traditional key pre-distribution schemes in sensor and ad hoc networks rely on the existence of a trusted third party to generate and distribute a key pool. The assumption of a single TTP however can be very strong in practice, especially when nodes belong to different domains and they come together in an ad hoc manner. In this work, we show the shortcomings of the previous approaches [3, 13] in terms of both efficiency and security. By incorporating a heterogeneous network, we show that we can dramatically reduce the load on resource constrained devices while also increasing their security. We also propose a new strengthened security model for self-organized ad hoc networks and evaluate the security of our protocol in this model.
Introduction
Traditional ad hoc and sensor network settings generally assume a trusted third party (TTP) who is trusted with the keying information and enables secure delivery of keys to the network principals and/or nodes. Security associations, such as authentication of nodes or securing communication channels, are then bootstrapped using this information. In key pre-distribution schemes, the TTP allocates keys to each node prior to deployment either randomly from a key pool [8, 5] , or by using a well-defined combinatorial structure such as a t-design [10] that ensures the key subsets allocated to the nodes satisfy certain properties.
However, the assumption of a single TTP can be restrictive in scenarios where the network is self-organized and formed without prior planning. In the following we list some of the immediate applications that require distribution of trust. The first example is in disaster response scenarios where a network may be formed with members belonging to different administrative domains. Furthermore, it might be impossible to access an outside authority due to the lack of preexisting infrastructure or inability to contact off-site systems [12] . In such life-threatening situations, it is not acceptable to deny data from a legitimate principal that might save someone's life. Therefore a 'best-effort' security model might be appropriate in this scenario, allowing strong guarantees when a single TTP can be established and weaker guarantees when no TTP can be assumed. Similarly in combat situations it is essential to allow members of a coalition to join and form collaborative groups. In such dynamic coalitions there is typically no single TTP prior to or during deployment.
Existence of a TTP is also in immediate conflict with privacy enhancing applications. As sensor and ad hoc testbeds have been deployed, it has become clear that user privacy can be easily compromised as a side effect to seemingly innocuous applications [4] . For example a humidity sensing network can also be used to monitor activity in a room as the human body effectively alters the room humidity. Therefore by removing the presence of an all knowing authority (i.e. the TTP), communication can be made private to the restricted user set.
Finally, to allow the wide adoption of sensor and ad hoc networks in everyday scenarios, it is desirable to reduce the required knowledge base of network owners. Customers should be able to purchase a set of nodes that are usable upon purchase without requiring the presence of a network administrator. Therefore the node manufacturer can install public data in the nodes that can bootstrap future security associations.
In the following we focus on the problem of group key distribution in selforganized ad hoc and sensor networks where no single point of trust exists. A group key allows nodes to securely communicate with each other and participate in collaborative tasks. The dynamic property of the network allow new nodes to join or exiting nodes to leave the group. This is an essential mechanism in the first two applications listed above. We consider heterogeneous networks consisting of two types of nodes: typical low performance sensor nodes and more powerful nodes with more computation and communication resources. It has been recently shown [7, 1] that networks that consist of homogeneous nodes cannot scale well and also have lower performance compared to networks that include a number of more powerful nodes. Introducing more powerful nodes also improves reliability and lifetime of the network [1]. Furthermore [15] showed that pairwise communication security in the presence of a TTP is not necessarily sacrificed if a key distribution scheme leverages the existence of more capable nodes.
Related Work
The first work on key pre-distribution in ad hoc network without a TTP is due to Chan [3] . In this construction each group member individually selects his keys from a common public key pool in a specified way. The aim of the protocol is to probabilistically construct a Cover Free Family (CFF) that will ensure shared keys between nodes. After the key selection phase, nodes follow a shared key discovery protocol that uses homomorphic encryption to discover nodes' shared keys. Chan showed that his scheme allows any two nodes to communicate securely with a high probability and the system provides security against collusion attack. However, [16] showed that the probability that the constructed structure is a CFF is very low and so the protocol cannot achieve its stated goal.
The closest work to our scheme is Luo et. al [13] who proposes a probabilistic group key management protocol (referred to as LSBS) for ad hoc homogeneous networks. The objective of LSBS is to establish a common shared key for the whole group. The protocol consists of three phases. In the setup phase, each node randomly selects a set of keys from the key pool and performs a shared key discovery (SKD) protocol with each neighboring node to discover shared keys. The group key is generated by special subsets of nodes called initiating groups (IG), and is distributed by flooding the network. Although LSBS protocol achieves its stated goal, in practice there are challenges that if not addressed makes the protocol impractical. In particular, our simulation of LSBS in [14] show the following shortcomings in the protocol.
Firstly, LSBS implicitly assumes that a single IG is formed where in practice many IGs may simultaneously exist. In fact our simulation results show that in a network of 1000 nodes, where each node has a key ring of size 150 keys, we can form up to 100 IGs. To obtain a single group key for all nodes some mechanism for negotiation and/or cooperation among IGs is required, which substantially increases the communication and computation cost which is very undesirable in a resource constrained network. The solutions also needs to be carefully designed to prevent security compromise. The communication cost of the shared key discovery (SSD) phase of the protocol is O(l) where l is the size of the key ring. LSBS requires a node u to execute the SSD protocol with all of its neighboring nodes. If on average a node is in the neighborhood of d other nodes, a communication cost of O(d · l) per node is incurred. For networks with battery powered nodes it is essential to reduce this cost in order to prolong network lifetime. Finally, LSBS is analyzed using a simple threat model that does not take into account real life threats in a wide range of application scenarios. The adversary is considered passive and can only eavesdrop on the communications. Given that the key pool is public, the adversary's objective is to either determine the node key or the link key that secures the link between two nodes. In sensor networks it is common to assume that the adversary can compromise a subset of nodes and obtain the secret information of the nodes. Such information includes the key rings of the node and the keys that the nodes share with their neighbors. This latter information will reduce the effort required for finding the key rings of uncompromised nodes, and/or the link keys for links between the compromised node and its neighbor nodes.
Our Contribution
In this paper, we propose a Layered Key Pre-Distribution (LKD) Scheme for networks of heterogenous nodes: resource constrained nodes and a small number of high performance nodes (level 1) which have more resources and are possibly better protected (e.g. use tamper proof hardware). LKD uses an unbalanced distribution of keys, where high performance nodes are allocated a larger key ring. The level 1-centric clusters that are formed around result in more efficient generation of group keys.
We give a probabilistic analysis of the protocol and show that the inclusion of a small number of more powerful nodes in the network results in constant communication and computation cost, independent of the neighborhood size of a node. We support our analysis via simulation results. We next evaluate the security of the protocol in a strengthened security model. We argue that with a public key pool and without a TTP, previous proposed threat models and security metrics such as network resiliency [5, 8] , which assumed secret key pool and a TTP, are no longer valid. We update these definitions for our new system and trust model and define a new security metric called neighbor resiliency. We analyze the security of both LKD and LSBS under this new threat model. Our analysis shows that LKD achieves better security than LSBS against node compromising adversaries because sensing nodes in LKD learn much less information about the nodes in their neighborhood.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes our network and trust model; Section 3 introduces the LKD protocol; Sections 4, 5 provide the correctness and the security analysis of the LKD protocol; Section 6 supports the theoretical analysis with simulation results. We provide concluding remarks and future directions in Section 7.
System Model
We consider the network to be fully self-organized, meaning that there is no infrastructure (hence no public key (PK) infrastructure). Traditional network models considered for sensor models not only assume a homogeneous network but also assume either a grid or a random graph [8, 5] model where all neighboring nodes are in communication contact. A more realistic model takes into consideration the various signal-blocking barriers and interference sources such as hills and buildings that exist in the deployed environment. In practice, deployed nodes are often segregated into exclusive neighborhoods due to the features of the landscape [15] . Our model accounts for this by considering a cluster based network, where sensor nodes form ad hoc groups around more powerful nodes which act as the backbone of the network. Therefore the sensor nodes connect to the rest of the network through the powerful 'gateway' nodes.
We assume a heterogeneous sensor network of size n consisting of two types of nodes: sensing or level 2 (L2) nodes which are resource constrained and have limited storage and energy capabilities and level 1 (L1) nodes which are more capable, with larger memory, more powerful transceivers and energy source. As a result L1 nodes can store larger key rings and other state data as well as communicate with a larger neighborhood of nodes. The network consists of c L1 nodes and (n − c) L2 nodes. Example L2 nodes are small Berkeley Mica2 motes with 8-bit 4MHz processors and 128 KB memories [2] . L1 nodes can be more powerful nodes such as laptops or other portable devices. Such devices have better physical protection against compromise, such as the use of tamper resistance hardware. However for simplicity, we assume the same type of protection for L1 and L2 nodes. We also assume that each node u i has a unique identifier i.
Trust Model. We assume that the network has no central authority or a single TTP. Each node essentially acts as its own domain authority. Public information (e.g. the key pool) is available to all, including malicious parties.
Authentication. Since we do not assume any TTP, it is impossible to establish strong authentication and identification amongst network nodes. We weaken our requirements such that to control the join of malicious nodes to the group, we assume some auxiliary identification mechanism for nodes (e.g. node hardware). Details of such a mechanism is outside the realm of our work.
Layered Key Pre-Distribution (LKD) Scheme
In this section we describe the LKD scheme to establish both pairwise and group keys in a self-organized network that does not have a TTP. The heterogenous network consists of resource constrained nodes (L2) and more capable nodes (L1) that contain a larger portion of the key pool than L2 nodes. It follows that L1 nodes are able to establish secure links with a larger portion of the nodes. In each neighborhood, local (l, r)-secure groups are established where l denotes the security level and r is the minimum number of nodes in the group. We will show later that r does not effect the security of the protocol and is used for efficiency purposes. Local groups in a neighborhood together generate a cluster group key which are exchanged to contributively generate a network group key. We ensure that the key generated in each layer (i.e. local, cluster or network) is independent. The overall algorithm consists of the following phases: initial setup, neighborhood discovery, cluster and group key generation, join and leave.
In the initial setup phase nodes agree on parameters used in the protocol. The system parameters include a public key pool and its partition into κ blocks of size m each. The security parameter is l which defines the level of link security by specifying the minimum number of keys two nodes need to share to establish a secure communication channel. The size of the key rings of L1 and L2 nodes are also set to k A and k B . We note that these parameters can either be set by the node manufacturers or during an initial setup phase prior to deployment.
A node u i randomly selects one key from each key block to form a key ring
Thus an L1 node needs to choose multiple keys from each block. Let k A = tk B + s, where t, s ∈ Z. Node selects t keys from block 1 to (k − s) and select (t + 1) keys from blocks (k − s) + 1 to block k (in total s key blocks).
Neighborhood Discovery Phase. In this phase, L1 nodes initially send beacons identifying themselves to their neighborhood nodes. The beacon message for L1 node u i can take the simple syntax of < i, L1 > where i is the node identifier.
An L2 node 'discovers' an L1 node when it hears its beacon message. To establish a secure channel with the L1 and help populate L1's incidence matrix, it runs a secure shared key discovery (SSKD) protocol, reminiscent of [3, 13] . This SSKD protocol is essentially a privacy preserving set intersection protocol that allows the two participating parties to discover their shared keys from their individual key sets.
For L1 node v i , the incidence matrix I i has k columns labeled by the node keys {K i j } k j=1 , and one row for each neighbor. I i (j, t) = 1 if K i t is shared with node u j in the neighborhood of v i , and zero otherwise. The incidence matrix of v i can be used to keep an account of the keys shared by the nodes in L1's neighborhood, given that the keys are shared with v i . This property is important as it maintains the optimal privacy for the neighboring L2 nodes. Specifically v i does not learn any information about the key ring of its neighboring nodes other than the shared key information it learns during the execution of the SSKD protocol.
If an L2 node is not directly connected to an L1 node (i.e. it is isolated from an L2), it simply waits and performs the join protocol after the key establishment protocol is complete. In this step, L1 nodes also discover each other and establish an l-secure channel between pairs of nodes. This communication network forms the backbone of the larger network.
Secure Shared Key Discovery (SSKD). Consider the case when node u j wants to discover the keys it shares with node u i . Let u i have keys {K
, where l, m ∈ Z. Assume the existence of a homomorphic encryption scheme, where E k (m) denotes encrypting message m using key k. The SSD protocol is as follows:
)) using the homomorphic property of the encryption scheme, where r is a random number. uj returns zg to ui. 3. ui decrypts zg to obtain rfi(K j g ). If value is zero, then they have a common key. 4. ui returns to uj an m-bit bitmap with 1 at bits where rfi(K j g ) = 0 and 0 elsewhere.
In contrast to LSBS, our SSKD protocol requires the nodes to exchange an m-bit bitmap indicating the shared keys of the participating nodes (step 4). The main reason for this inclusion is that L1 nodes in LKD can select more than one key from each block and so nodes must indicate which key in the block is shared or not, using the bitmap.
Securing Bitmap Transmission. A potential security leakage is the bitmap exchange step of the SSD, which identifies to an eavesdropper the number of keys shared by two nodes. A smart adversary can then compromise a neighboring node which shares the most keys with a target node, as well as reducing the search space for the channel securing key.
The following protocol takes advantage of the privacy preserving characteristics of a homomorphic encryption scheme such as El Gamal [9] . Assume node u i wants to privately send a k-bit bitmap b to node u j . We use the multiplicative homomorphic properties of the El Gamal [9] encryption scheme for u i to send b to u j . Specifically this property is defined as:
where E K (m) is the encryption of m using key K.
Let the El Gamal public key of u j be (g, h) and the secret key be (x = log g h).
Node u j encrypts a dummy message d and sends to u i the ciphertext and its PK. u i multiplies the bitmap with the ciphertext and randomizes the message using r . Using its private key, u j can decrypt the processed ciphertext and obtain the bitmap. This protocol ensures that the bitmap remains private to u i , u j assuming the El Gamal encryption scheme is secure.
By loading nodes with a set of random r values and associated g r , h r during the setup phase it is possible to reduce computation to one exponentiation and two multiplications per node. Furthermore we note that although we are using PK cryptography, we do not rely on the existence of a PKI and therefore we preserve the distributed nature of the network. Finally, we point out that this step is only performed once or twice by sensing nodes through out their lifetime. [14] shows further techniques to reduce energy consumption during this step.
Cluster and Group Key Generation. In this phase, L1 nodes v i use their incidence matrix I i to assist the nodes in their neighborhoods to initiate local (l, r) groups where a minimum of r nodes share l keys. This is done by finding a set of r rows R and at least l columns L in the incidence matrix for which an (l, r)-secure subset can be formed. The formation of the local groups allow v i to communicate to a group of nodes via multicast thus reducing communication. Also nodes in local groups contribute to the formation of the cluster keys thus preventing the selection of weak keys. Once a local (l, r) group is formed, v i informs the group members of their group membership using secure channels. Local group members now can communicate securely using their secret group key K L , which is the XOR of the group shared keys. Each local group L i in cluster C contributively generate a partial cluster key K Li C in order to democratically agree on a cluster key
Potentially two L2 nodes which are not in direct communication can belong to the same local group. In this case, the L1 node can be used as an intermediate routing point to forward messages. Also if L1 nodes use directed antennas, L1 node can group an (l, r) subset together iff they are in the same vicinity.
The group key can be generated similar to the cluster key by requiring nodes to select a key share for the group key along with the cluster key share. L1 nodes then exchange the partial group key generated in their neighborhoods to arrive at the final group key.
Join and Leave. A newly deployed node u i can join the network by establishing an l-secure channel to a node u j which already belongs to the secure group. u j essentially acts for u i as the 'gateway' to the network. In the case of an L2 node u i leaving the group, the neighborhood L1 node uses its incidence matrix to determine the effected keys and purging them. Thus the departing node has no information regarding the key rings of the nodes in its neighborhood. Due to space constraint, we refer the reader to [14] for more details of these protocols.
Correctness Analysis
In this section we show the correctness of the LKD protocol. We say that LKD is correct if the protocol allows the 'backbone' L1-network as well as the cluster of L2 nodes around an L1 node, to be connected and thus functioning with a high probability. Later we verify our results by simulation.
In our theoretical analysis we limit the key ring size of L1 nodes k A = t·k B +s as follows (k B is the key ring size of L2 nodes):
. We analyze the general case when s can be assigned any value from [0..k B ]. We refer the reader to [14] for the special case when s = k B . To establish an l-secure link, two nodes share at least l keys. For readability purposes, in the rest of the paper we use the notation A and B to refer to L1 and L2 nodes respectively.
Let set S consist of the s key blocks from which an L1 node selects two keys and letS consist of the remaining k − s key blocks. Let P A,B (r, l) be the probability of r nodes (one L1 node and (r − 1) L2 nodes) sharing at least l keys. Let Z x be the event that r nodes share a key in a given block x. The probability that Z x occurs, is equal to p s for blocks x ∈ S, and ps for x ∈S. Key collisions for each block can be modeled as independent Bernoulli trials. The generating function for probabilities P A,B (r, l) is calculated as the product of two binomials with success probabilities of p s and ps:
Proposition 1. The probability that the r nodes share exactly l keys is equal to the coefficient C l of the x l term in polynomial Equation 1, and P A,B (r, l) = k B i=l C i , where C i is the coefficient of the x i term in f (x) and k B denotes the size of the key ring of L2 nodes.
3 Proposition 2. Let P A,A (2, l) be the probability of two L1 nodes sharing at least l keys. Let α, β, γ be non-negative integers satisfying 2α + β + γ = l. Let p i be the probability of sharing i keys for the first s blocks andp i be the probability of sharing i keys for the remaining k − s blocks. Then:
This proposition is based on the fact that the first s blocks can contribute 0, 1 or 2 shared keys per block, and the last (k − s) blocks can contribute 0 or 1 shared keys per block. In the above formulae, α represents blocks that share 2 keys and β and γ represent blocks that share only 1 key in S andS respectively. For a more detailed proof, refer to [14] . Fig. 1(a) compares the probabilities of two nodes establishing an l-secure channel for different node types, when the key pool is made up of 200 blocks, with a block size of five keys. We can see a rapid transition in the probability of establishing an l-secure channel for different l. Fig. 1(b) generalizes the node pair to groups of r nodes. It is intuitive that establishing an l-secure channel becomes less probable as the group size increases. We also note that when there is a high probability for l-secure channel among r nodes, the probability of establishing a secure channel between two L1 nodes will be an even higher value. It is also interesting to note that the phase transition becomes slower as the number of nodes in the group increases. Fig. 1(c) graphs the probability of establishing an l-secure channel between an L1 node and an L2 node for different values of s. The results confirm intuition by showing that as the key ring of an L1 node becomes larger, the probability of a secure connection with a L2 node increases. A similar result is verified in Fig. 1(d) when we consider r nodes, consisting of one L1 node and (r − 1) L2 nodes.
In a more general version of this problem, a node can select extra keys from any block of its choosing, rather than the first s blocks. It is intuitive that in this version of the problem, the probabilities of establishing an l-secure channel do not increase to the same extent as the more special case presented above. We leave the analysis of this problem as a future exercise.
The graphs presented in this section allow a network administrator to choose appropriate values for the system parameters. In the following section, we show how an increased key ring not only increases the probability of establishing a secure channel (as shown), but also decreases the security of the system. It is therefore important to achieve the proper balance between connectivity and security. Section 6 gives simulation results to confirm the theoretical results.
Security Model and Analysis
We analyze the security of LKD against two types of adversaries: (i) Passive adversary with only access to public data, protocol description and transcript of node communications; (ii) Node Capturing (NC) adversary with access to all the information available to a passive adversary, and also the private data of nodes that it has captured. We do not allow a NC adversary to interact with the nodes. That is we only consider the case when the adversary uses its information to eavesdrop on others' communication. The goal of both adversaries therefore, is to learn the secret keys between nodes that are used to secure their links.
The security of traditional key pre-distribution schemes that assume the existence of a TTP [8, 5, 6, 11] are based on the facts that (i) the keys in the key pool are exclusively secret to the TTP, (ii) nodes key ring are private, and (iii) the link communication is confidential. In this model an adversary cannot introduce a 'new' device into the network because even if there is no authentication mechanism, it does not have access to the key pool. However by compromising legitimate nodes and obtaining their key rings and/or identities, an adversary can gain entrance into the secure network. The more nodes an adversary compromises, the more it learns of the key pool and the more effective an attack it can launch against a target secure channel. This notion is captured by the resiliency of the protocol against node compromise, where resiliency metric is defined to be "the fraction of links in the network a node-compromising adversary is able to eavesdrop on, as a result of recovering keys from captured nodes" [5] . A protocol has stronger security if the adversary is forced to compromise a larger percentage of the nodes to eavesdrop on a target channel. Also, in [8, 5] information that an NC adversary obtains from captured devices combined with the key indices allows him to gain information about the keys belonging to other network nodes.
The security of the self-organized (SO) protocols do not rest on the secrecy of the key pool; in fact, the key pool is considered to be public information and can be accessed by the adversary. This means that if there are no auxiliary means of authentication, the adversary can introduce a malicious node v with the aim of extracting key information from a victim node u: v can choose a key ring and run SKD with u to find out a subset of keys of u (that they share). It can then select a new key ring and repeat the protocol. After sufficient runs of this, v can learn all the keys of u. This means that it is crucial to assume a method of node authentication that prevents the adversary from introducing nodes of its choice. Since this is not the focus of our paper, we do not consider this scenario and leave it for future work.
The security of the SO protocols is based exclusively on (i) the size of the key pool and (ii) the security of link keys. In LKD, a NC advesary gains only local information from a compromised node; that is, it learns only the key ring of the node and potentially any information it shares with nodes it associates with. In the case of LKD, a node u i associates only with its neighboring nodes N i ; by compromising u i an adversary learns not only the key ring of u i but also the keys it shares with its neighboring nodes. Thus by compromising u i , the adversary can tighten its search space when attacking (i) a link between two nodes where at least one is neighbor to u i or (ii) the key ring of a node neighbor to u i . We capture this notion in the following security parameter for the SO model: Neighbor resiliency is defined as the fraction of the key pool the adversary can discard in its exhaustive key search to attack a target secure channel, as a result of recovering keys from neighboring captured nodes. Another security metric we consider is the advantage the adversary gains in determining the key ring of a node when it is in the neighborhood of a compromised node.
In the following, we analyze LKD against first a passive and then a NC adversary. An eavesdropping adversary cannot obtain any information about the keys except to exhaustively guess at the final shared key between nodes. This is because in the course of the key establishment protocol, no information about the key ring of the nodes is leaked. The adversary knows that there are N = mk possible keys and at least l keys from k different possible blocks are used to secure a link. Thus, the search space for the attacker is equal to k t=l k t m l . Similarly, to determine the key ring of a node of size k, the adversary must exhaustively search k t m l possibilities. Due to space constraints, we refer the reader to [14] for the detailed analysis of LSBS.
Because L2 nodes in LKD do not compute an incidence matrix, a compromised L2 node u c does not leak any keying information about its neighboring nodes. However the adversary does learn (i) The keys that u c has in common with the L1 node in its cluster, or if it is not connected to an L1 node, the connecting L2 node; (ii) If it is part of an (l, r)-secure local group, only the keys it shares with all of them.
Consider three nodes u i , u j and u c . Assume u i ∈ N c , u i ∈ N j , and u c is a compromised node. Let k be the size of the key rings of u c , u i , u j respectively. The goal of the adversary is to break the secret link between u i , u j . By compromising u c , the adversary obtained the following information: u c and u i share b keys and do not share (k c − b). To guess the key ring of u i , the adversaries' search space is reduced from m k to m k−b . The search space to exhaustively guess l shared keys between u i and u j is reduced from Thus the search space to break an l-secure link between u i and u j is equal to:
However the number of links and nodes to which these reduced probabilities can be applied to has been decreased dramatically. This is primarily because LKD does not require an L2 node to connect to every node in its neighborhood. Instead the number of secure connections an L2 node needs to establish as well as the keys it shares with neighboring nodes has been reduced to only those that are necessary.
In the event that an adversary compromises an L1 node and the L1 node does not have any tamper resistant hardware, the adversary gains keying information about all the nodes in its neighborhood. In this case the adversary gains as much information as in the LSBS protocol. Since the majority of the nodes in the network are L2 nodes, we can conclude that on average the advantage that an adversary gains by compromising nodes in LKD has been reduced and therefore LKD is more secure than LSBS.
Simulation and Discussion
The simulation assumes a static network of n = 1060 nodes, consisting of 60 L1 nodes and 1000 L2 nodes. This is a reasonable assumption in a dense static network or a highly dynamic network when nodes move around but in a bounded region (e.g a group of rescuers in an emergency situation or troops in a battlefield). We assume that L1 nodes have twice the transmission range R A of L2 nodes R B . To guarantee network connectivity and thus allow a large portion of the nodes to participate in the secure group communication, we use the system parameter relationships derived by [8] based on the phase transition theory of Erdös and Rényi for connected random graphs. For network connectivity, we require that the neighborhood of each L2 node include 40 other nodes. This is a reasonable assumption used by [8, 5, 15] . We also need to guarantee that the L1-network (the network of L1 nodes) is connected. Using the area needed for 1000 L2 nodes where the neighborhood of each L2 node has on average 40 nodes, we use 60 L1 nodes where each L1 node is neighbor to 10-15 L1 nodes. At the beginning of the simulation, each node randomly selects a key ring of size k A = 300 for L1 nodes and k B = 150 for L2 nodes. Nodes can establish an l-secure connection by sharing at least l keys.
We simulated LSBS using the above configuration in [14] by excluding the L1 nodes. Our results highlighted the shortcomings of LSBS and various practical issues regarding IG formation that were not dealt with in [13] . We summarize these as follows: (1) As the number of shared keys needed to establish a secure channel decreases, a larger number of initiator groups get created. This leads to high network communication due to the respective network floods and higher computation load due to the subsequent encryption and decryption of flooded messages; (2) There is a sharp transition rate for the number of IGs formed for different key block sizes m. Fig. 2(a) shows the jump from very small number of IGs (e.g. m = 5) to almost 50 IGs when m = 4. However we know that the larger the number of keys shared between two neighbors, the less resilient the protocol is against neighbor-compromise. It is thus important to select network parameters such that allow us to minimize the number of IGs that get created but to also achieve a high degree of security against both an active and a passive adversary. By introducing hierarchy in the LSBS scheme, we are able to better control not only the formation of the local and cluster groups but also the distribution of the group keys. Fig. 2(b) and (c) show the probabilities of connection for different local group sizes as well how much of the neighborhood can establish a pairwise l-secure connection with an L1 node. Our results show that with very high probability, we can achieve a connected network. In particular, an L2 node can establish a secure connection with an L1 node with very high probability. Fig. 2(d) graphs the distribution of the size of the (l, r)-groups centering around each L1 node. Each group on average is made up of one L1 node and three L2 nodes. We emphasize that the size of a group has no influence on the security of the group key, rather it ensures a more democratic process since more nodes contribute to the calculation of the group key.
Comparing the performance of LKD and LSBS protocols, the necessary resources of a sensing node is reduced in LKD as: Reduced communication load. The L2-network is no longer flooded with all the partial group keys due to the clustering of the nodes and the management of the local (l, r) groups by the L1 nodes. In particular, each L2 node, with a high probability, needs to only connect to the neighboring L1 node. Furthermore if it falls in an (l, r) group, it needs to exchange O(r) number of messages to generate a partial cluster and group key. Therefore the number of messages that a sensing node receives and transmits is no longer a function of the neighborhood size. Reduced computation load. LKD avoids the need for each sensing node to perform multiple decryption and re-encryptions when transporting the group key. In addition the management and decision making required for IG formation has been avoided and made a responsibility of the powerful L1 nodes. In particular in LKD with a high probability, each sensing node performs the SSKD protocol once with the neighboring L1 node. In contrast in LSBS nodes executed the SSKD protocol with every node in their neighborhood (e.g. in our simulation, this would be 40 times). Reduced storage space. In LKD sensing nodes do not store the incidence matrix which is of the order O(k · d) where k is the key ring size and d is the size of the neighborhood. Nodes also do not need to keep an account of the different local groups or IGs they belong to.
Finally we note that in LKD, the load on each L1 node is at most equal to the load on every node in LSBS. Also, the number of times LKD floods the network of L1 nodes is in the same order as the number of floods of the whole network for LSBS.
Concluding Remarks
Traditional solutions for key pre-distribution assume the existence of a single TTP. This assumption however can be very strong in practice, especially when nodes belong to different domain and they come together in an ad hoc manner, as in disaster response scenarios. In this work we showed the shortcomings of previous works [3, 13] in this area using both theoretical analysis as well as simulation. We propose a new scheme that incorporates heterogeneous nodes to ameliorate the previous shortcomings, whereby the load on resource limited nodes is reduced dramatically while in fact improving their security against nodecompromising adversaries. In the course of our security analysis we pointed out a lack of security model for self-organized networks and thus presented a security model of key distribution protocols in a self-organized ad hoc network.
Our theoretical and simulation analysis pointed to a number of future research directions. The adversary model can be analyzed further, providing simulation results to compare with the theoretical results presented in this paper. We need to also come up with a good communication model to ensure that we do not end up with a disconnected graph. Finally, it is interesting to see how mobility of nodes can help ameliorate the lack of connectivity in the network.
